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Abstract. Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are evolving as a key technology 
for next-generation wireless networks showing raid progress and numerous 
applications. These networks have the potential to provide robust and high-
throughput data delivery to wireless users. In a WMN, high speed routers 
equipped with advanced antennas, communicate with each other in a multi-hop 
fashion over wireless channels and form a broadband backhaul. However, the 
throughput of a WMN may be severely degraded due to presence of some 
selfish routers that avoid forwarding packets for other nodes even as they send 
their own traffic through the network. This paper presents an algorithm for 
detection of selfish nodes in a WMN that uses statistical theory of inference for 
reliable clustering of the nodes based on local observations. Simulation results 
show that the algorithm has a high detection rate and a low false positive rate.  
Keywords: Wireless mesh networks, AODV protocol, selfish nodes, clustering, 
node misbehavior. 
1   Introduction 
Wireless mesh networking has emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges 
in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable 
architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers. Unlike 
traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired 
network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired 
network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet 
gateways (IGWs), while the others are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are 
connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. In a community-based 
WMN, a group of MRs managed by different operators form an access network to 
provide last-mile connectivity to the Internet. As with any end-user supported 
infrastructure, cooperative behavior in these networks cannot be assumed a priori. 
Preserving scarce access bandwidth and power, as well as security concerns may 
induce some selfish users to avoid forwarding data for other nodes. The selfish MRs 
degrade the routing performance in WMN by decreasing the network throughput [1]. 
To enforce cooperation among nodes and detect selfish nodes in ad hoc wireless 
networks, various collaboration schemes have been proposed in the literature [2]. 
Majority of these proposals are based on trust and reputation frameworks which 
attempts to identify misbehaving nodes by suitable decision making algorithms. To 
address the issue of selfish nodes in a WMN, this paper presents a scheme that uses 
local observations in the nodes for detecting node misbehavior. The scheme is 
applicable for on-demand routing protocols like AODV, and uses statistical theory of 
inference and clustering techniques to make a robust and reliable classification of the 
nodes based on their packet forwarding activities. It also introduces some additional 
fields in the packet header for AODV protocol so that detection accuracy is increased. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some related work. 
Section 3 gives a brief background of the AODV protocol and a finite state machine 
model of the local observations of a node. The proposed scheme is described in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents simulations results, and Section 6 concludes the paper 
while identifying some potential future work.  
2   Related Work 
The concept of neighborhood monitoring to check the activities of other nodes has 
been proposed by researchers in the context of wireless ad hoc networks. The idea of 
watchdog mechanism to monitor neighbors was first proposed by Marti et al. [3]. 
Buchegger et al. have proposed the CONFIDANT protocol that assigns a rating for 
every node in an ad hoc network based on watchdog and second-hand rating 
information gathered from other nodes [4]. Mahajan et al. have proposed a 
mechanism named CATCH [5], which consists of two modules: (i) anonymous 
challenge message (ACM) and (ii) anonymous neighbor verification (ANV). First, an 
ACM message from an unknown sender is sent to all its neighbors. In the ANV phase, 
a tester node sends cryptographic hash of a random token for rebroadcast and also 
records other hashes sent by others. The tester node releases the secret token to 
another node which successfully authenticates itself. Vigna et al. have proposed an 
approach to detect intrusions in AODV that works on stateful signature-based analysis 
of the observed traffic [6]. Pirzada et al. have described a model of building trust 
relationship between nodes in an ad hoc network [7]. Conti et al. have proposed a 
scheme in which a node exploits its local knowledge to estimate the reliability of a 
path [8]. Unlike the conventional method of denying selfish users, it provides a 
degraded service to these nodes by selective slow packet forwarding. Santhanam et al. 
have presented a mechanism to judge the behavior of a node based on observed traffic 
reports submitted to local sink agents dispersed throughout the network [9]. The sink 
nodes apply a set of forwarding rules to isolate a selfish node based on the number of 
times it is caught in selfish acts. Tseng et al. have applied techniques based on finite 
state machines to detect misbehaving nodes in the AODV routing protocol [10]. Yang 
et al. have described the SCAN protocol that addresses two issues: (i) routing (control 
packets) misbehavior, and (ii) forwarding (data packets) misbehavior [11].   
The proposed mechanism in this paper relies on local observation of each node in a 
WMN. Based on the local information in each node and using a finite state machine 
model of the AODV protocol, a robust statistical theory of estimation is applied to 
identify selfish nodes in the network. The scheme is a modification of the protocol 
proposed in [12]. The objective of the proposed mechanism is to achieve higher 
detection efficiency by exploiting the information in some additional fields in the 
packet header in AODV routing. The algorithm is discussed in Section 4. 
3   AODV and Modeling of the State Machine 
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol uses an on-demand 
approach for finding routes to a destination node. The source node floods the route 
request (RREQ) packet in the network when a route is not available for the desired 
destination. It may obtain multiple routes to different destinations from a single 
RREQ. The RREQ carries the source identifier (src_id), the destination identifier 
(dest_id), the source sequence number (src_seq_num), the destination sequence 
number (dest_seq_num), the broadcast identifier (bcast_id), and the time to live 
(TTL). When an intermediate node receives a RREQ, it either forwards the request 
further or prepares a route reply (RREP) if it has a valid route to the destination. 
Every intermediate node, while forwarding a RREQ, enters the previous node’s 
address and its bcast_id. A timer is used to delete this entry in case a RREP is not 
received before the timer expires. When a node receives a RREP packet, information 
of the previous node from which the packet was received is also stored, so that data 
packets may be routed to that node as the next hop towards the destination. 
It is clear that AODV depends heavily on cooperation among the nodes. A selfish 
node can easily manipulate it to minimize its chances of being included on routes for 
which it is not the source or the destination. The proposed mechanism detects selfish 
nodes in a WMN so that they may be isolated from the network. In the following 
subsection, the finite state machine model of the protocol is presented.  
3.1   Finite State Machine Model  
In the proposed mechanism, the messages corresponding to a RREQ flooding and the 
unicast RREP is referred to as a message unit. It is clear that no node in the network 
can observe all the transmission in a message unit. The subset of a message unit that a 
node can observe is referred to as the local message unit (LMU). The LMU for a 
particular node consists of the messages transmitted by the node and its neighbors, 
and the messages overheard by the node. The selfish node detection is done based on 
data collected by each node from its observed LMUs. For each message transmission 
in an LMU, a node maintains a record of its sender, and the receiver, and the neighbor 
nodes that receive the RREQ broadcast sent by the node itself.  
The finite state machine shown in Fig. 1 depicts various states in which a node may 
exist for each LMU [12]. The states corresponding to the numbers mentioned in Fig.1 
are listed in Table 1. The final states are shaded. Each message sent by a node causes 
a transition in each of its neighbor’s finite state machine. The finite state machine in 
one neighbor gives only a local view of the activities of that node. It does not in any 
way, reflects the overall behavior of the node. The collaboration of each neighbor 
node makes it possible to get an accurate picture about the monitored node’s 
behavior. In the rest of the paper, a node being monitored by its neighbors is referred 
to as a monitored node, and its neighbors are referred to as a monitor node. In the 
protocol, each node plays the dual role of a monitor node and a monitored node. 
Table 1.  The states of the finite state machine for a local message unit (LMU) 
State Interpretation 
1: init 
2: unexp RREP 
3: rcvd RREQ 
4: fwd RREQ 
5: timeout RREQ 
6: rcvd RREP 
7: LMU complete 
8: timeout RREP 
Initial phase; no RREQ is observed 
Receipt of a  RREP without RREQ observed 
Receipt of a RREQ observed 
Broadcast of a RREQ observed 
Timeout after receipt of RREQ 
Receipt of a RREP observed 
Forwarding of a valid a RREP observed 
Timeout after receipt of a RREP 
 
Each monitor node observes a series of interleaved LMUs for a routing session. 
Each LMU can be identified by the source-destination pair contained in a RREQ 
message. Let the kth LMU observed by a monitor node be denoted as (sk, dk). The pair 
(sk, dk) does not uniquely identify a LMU, because the source can issue multiple 
RREQs for the same destination. However, since the subsequent RREQs have some 
delays associated with them, it may be assumed that there is only one active LMU (sk, 
dk) at any point of time. At the start of a routing session, a monitored node is at the 
state 1 in its finite state machine. As the monitor node(s) observes the behavior of the 
monitored node based on the LMUs, it records transitions form its initial state 1 to 
one of its possible final states -- 5, 7 and 8. 
 
 
 
   Fig. 1. Finite state machine of a monitored node 
 
When a monitor node broadcasts a RREQ, it assumes that the monitored node has 
received it. The monitor node, therefore, records a state transition 1  3 for the 
monitored node’s finite state machine. If a monitor node observes a monitored node 
to broadcast a RREQ, then a state transition of 3  4 is recorded if the RREQ 
message was previously sent by the monitor node to the monitored node; otherwise a 
transition of 1  4 is recorded since in this case, the RREQ was received by the 
monitored node from some other neighbor. The transition to a timeout state occurs 
when a monitor node finds no activity of the monitored node for the LMU before the 
expiry of a timer. When a monitor node observes a monitored node to forward a 
RREP, it records a transition to the final state – LMU complete (State No 7). At this 
state, the monitored node becomes a candidate for inclusion on a routing path. When 
the final state is reached, the state machine terminates and the state transitions are 
stored by each node for each neighbor. After sufficient number of events is collected, 
a statistical analysis is performed to detect the presence of any selfish nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 2. An example local message unit (LMU) observed by node N 
Fig. 2 depicts an example of LMU observed by the node N during the discovery of 
a route from the source node S to the destination node D indicated by bold lines. 
Table 2 shows the events observed by node N and the corresponding state transitions 
for each of its three neighbor nodes X, Y and Z.  
Table 2.  The state transitions of the neighbour nodes of node N 
Neighbor Events State changes 
X X  broadcasts RREQ 
N  broadcasts RREQ 
N  sends RREP to X 
X  sends RREP to S (overheard) 
1  4 
4  4 
4  6 
6  7 
Y Y  broadcasts RREQ 
N  broadcasts RREQ 
Timeout 
1  4 
4  4 
4  5 
Z N  broadcasts RREQ 
Z  broadcasts RREQ 
Z  sends RREP to N 
1  3 
3  4 
4  7 
4   The Proposed Algorithm 
A monitoring node keeps track of state transitions in the finite state machine of a 
monitored node for each LMU. These sequences are represented as a transition matrix 
T = [Tij], where Tij is the number of times the transition i  j  is found. The monitor 
node invokes a detection algorithm every W seconds using data from the most recent 
D = d * W seconds of observations, where d is a small integer. The parameter D, the 
detection window, is such that it allows prompt punishment of the selfish nodes with a 
high level of accuracy. Section 4.1 discusses the features of the algorithm. 
4.1   The Features of the Algorithm 
While a transition matrix summarizes the local behavior of a monitored node, it is not 
possible to determine the selfish behavior of a node based only on its local transition 
probabilities. By comparing the transition matrices of a collection of nodes, one might 
be able to detect selfish nodes with higher confidence. For this reason, the proposed 
algorithm initially clusters the neighbors of a monitoring node and then classifies the 
clusters into selfish or cooperative nodes. The steps of the algorithm are: First, the 
clustering algorithm is made robust by the use of a statistical theory of inference-
based approach that takes into account the pair-wise comparisons of the transition 
matrices of each pair of nodes. Second, for identification of the cluster that contains 
the selfish nodes, a measure, called cooperation index, for the nodes is computed. The 
cluster having its cooperation index less than a threshold value is assumed to contain 
the selfish nodes. Finally, a test is developed based on the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) among the clusters to determine whether clustering is informative to the 
purpose of classification. In Section 4.2, the proposed algorithm is described. 
4.2   The Detection Algorithm  
In the proposed algorithm, a node is assumed to monitor the activities of its R 
neighbors which are identified by their respective indices 1, 2,….R. Let [ ])()( rijr fT =   
denote the observed transition matrix for the rth neighbor, where ][ )(rijf  is the number 
of transitions from state i to state j observed in the previous detection window. If m is 
the number of states in the finite state machine in each node, the size of )(rT  is m x m. 
Let ],...[ )()(1)( rimrir ffT =  denote the ith row of the transition matrix )(rT , which shows 
the transitions out of state i at the neighbor node r. If two neighbor nodes r and s have 
identical distributions corresponding to transitions from state i, then )()( si
r
i TT ≡ . To 
test the hypothesis )()( si
r
i TT ≡  the Pearson’s χ2 test is used as follows. 
 
                                        
[ ]
)(
),( 1
2)()(
2 )( l
ij
srl
m
j
l
ij
l
ij
f
ff
i
∑ ∑
=
−
=
εχ                                   (1) 
 
)()(
)()(
)()(
s
i
r
i
s
ij
r
ijl
ij
l
ij FF
ff
Ff
+
+
=  
)(r
iF  and  
)(s
iF  denote total number of transitions for state i in 
)(rT  and  )(sT  
respectively. If the value of χ2 exceeds the value of χ2m-1,α , then the hypothesis 
)()( s
i
r
i TT ≡   is rejected at confidence interval α. If we write rsiK  for the event that 
χ
2
(i) > χ
2
m-1,α , then the conditional probability ( )rsisiri BTTP |)()( ≡  can be taken as a 
reasonable estimator of the similarity between r and s with respect to the state i. In 
absence of any prior information, it is reasonable to assume that r and s have no 
similarity in state i and the probability that the Pearson test rejects its hypothesis to be 
0.5 [12]. In order to evaluate the similarity between r and s for all the m states, (1) is 
applied to all rows of T(r) and T(s). This yields a vector ][ )()( rsirs BB = , {i = 1,…m}. 
From the standard Markovian principle one can write: 
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The lower-order terms in the right hand side of (3) are ignored since α << 1. For 
small value of α, Lrs monotonically decreases in S(rs), which, as evident from (3), 
represents the number of rejections of Pearson’s hypothesis. Therefore, 1 - Lrs may be 
taken as the measure of the dissimilarity between the neighbor nodes r and s. In 
presence of noise, however, it is found that for two nodes r and s which have Lrs ≈ 1, a 
third node t may cause inconsistency such that Lrt ≉ Lst . To avoid this, clusters are not 
formed on the basis of pair-wise dissimilarity. To compute dissimilarity between r 
and s, the L values for all neighbors are computed with respect to r and s separately, 
and (4) is applied: 
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The computation of drs does not involve the pair-wise similarity index (Lrs) 
between nodes r and s. It measures the degree of inconsistency in similarity between r 
and s with all their neighbors. Since in the computation of drs, contribution of each 
neighbor is considered, it is a robust indicator of dissimilarity between nodes [12]. For 
clustering, an agglomerative hierarchical clustering technique is used, in which each 
cluster is represented by all of the objects in the cluster, and the similarity between 
two clusters is measured by the similarity of the closest pair of data points belonging 
to different clusters. After the nodes are clustered into similar sets, they are further 
classified into three groups: (i) a set (G) of cooperative nodes, (ii) a set (B) of selfish 
nodes, and (iii) a set of nodes whose behavior could not be ascertained. The 
cooperation score (Cr) of a node is computed as [12]: 
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To reduce the false positives (i.e. wrongly identification), an ANOVA test is 
applied that computes a probability Pk of the random variation among the mean 
cooperation scores of k clusters [12]. A small value of Pk  implies that the clusters 
actually represent differences in their behaviors. At each iteration, k clusters are 
formed and Pk is compared with a pre-defined level of significance β. If Pk < β, 
clusters reliably reflect the behavior of the nodes. The cluster with lowest mean 
cooperation score contains the selfish nodes. If Pk > Pk-1, the behavior of the nodes are 
not reflected in the clusters. In this case, all the nodes are classified as cooperative, 
and the next iteration of the algorithm is executed.  
Even with the above statistical approach, there is still a possibility of 
misclassification. The probability of misclassification is further reduced by a new 
cross-checking mechanism that involves a minor modification in the AODV packet 
header. Two additional fields, next_to_source and duplicate_flag are inserted in a 
RREQ header to indicate respectively the next-hop address of the source, and whether 
the packet is a duplicate packet already broadcasted by some other nodes. In the 
RREP header, in addition to these two, another field called next_to_destination is 
added to indicate the node to which the packet is to be forwarded in the reverse path. 
With these additional fields, it is possible to detect every instance of selfish behavior 
in a wireless network, if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) no packet is lost 
due to interference, (ii) links are bi-directional, (iii) the nodes are stationary, and (iv) 
queuing delays are bounded [13]. The robust clustering and monitoring with 
additional fields substantially increase the detection as evident from the results. 
5   Simulation Results 
The protocol is evaluated with network simulator ns-2 [14] in order to compare it with 
the algorithm in [12]. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 3.  
Table 3.  Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
Simulation area 
Simulation duration 
No. of nodes in the network 
MAC protocol 
Routing protocol 
Raw channel bandwidth 
Traffic type 
Network traffic volume 
Packet size 
Time-out for RREQ broadcast 
Time-out for receiving RREP 
Pearson confidence (α) 
Observation window (W) 
Detection window (D) 
Session arrival distribution 
Session duration distribution 
900 m * 900 m 
1600 sec 
50 
802.11b 
AODV 
11 Mbps 
CBR UDP 
60 packets/sec 
512 bytes 
0.5 sec 
3 sec 
0.1 
100 sec 
400 sec 
Poisson 
Exponential 
At the start of the simulation, a fraction of nodes are chosen randomly as the selfish 
nodes. A selfish node adopts either of the two strategies: (i) dropping RREQs 
(DROP_REQ) and (ii) dropping RREPs (DROP_REP). In both cases, control packets 
are dropped with a constant probability. For DROP_REP, a selfish node always 
rebroadcasts RREQs even if it has a route in its cache. To evaluate the detection 
efficiency and speed, the packet dropping probability is varied from 1.0 to 0.1. The 
value of the parameter β is chosen as 0.4 to achieve the best tradeoff between 
detection rate and false positive rate. 
 
 
         Fig. 3. The detection rate in DROP_REQ        Fig. 4. The false alarm rate in DROP_REQ 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 represent respectively the detection rate and the false alarm rate 
when 50% nodes in the network are selfish and drop RREQs (i.e. DROP_REQ). The 
results are the average of 10 runs of the simulation. The algorithm performs better 
than Wang’s algorithm since it doubly checks the detection results- from the 
clustering and from the routing header information to make more reliable detection. 
 
 
 
         Fig. 5. The detection rate in DROP_REP       Fig. 6. The false alarm rate in DROP_REP 
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that the packet dropping (DROP_REP) has no impact on the 
detection rate and the false positive rate when 50% nodes in the network are selfish 
nodes. This difference in DROP_REQ and DROP_REP lies in the fact that while 
RREQ is a broadcast message sent by the source, the RREP is sent in a single path by 
the destination in a unicast manner. Since RREP involves only a few nodes, for 
majority of them the state machine will terminate in state 5, instead of states 7 and 8. 
It is evident that the proposed algorithm gives an average 80% increase in detection 
rate and 50 % reduction in false positives compared with the Wang’s algorithm. 
6   Conclusion and Future Work 
Detection of selfish nodes is crucial in WMNs since these nodes don’t forward 
packets for other nodes and degrade the performance of the networks.  This paper has 
presented a statistical theory of inference-based clustering algorithm for detection of 
selfish nodes. Using the AODV protocol a finite state machine model is developed 
based on the local observations of each node. To increase the reliability of clustering, 
an ANOVA test and a new cross-checking mechanism are used.  Simulation results 
show that the algorithm has high detection efficiency and reduced false alarm rates. 
Designing an efficient and secure routing algorithm that uses the output of the 
detection algorithm and avoids the selfish node constitutes a future plan of work. 
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